

## Transforming Social Practice: An Action Science Perspective

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Action science is a form of inquiry into how we design action and how we might create better organizations. It is concerned with practical knowledge for the conduct of human affairs. Action science proceeds by helping people reflect together on matters of concern to them so that they can understand their situation more adequately, make intelligent choices, and enhance their capabilities for action.

The idea of an action science has been developed by Chris Argyris, Donald Schön, and people who have worked with them (Argyris, 1980, 1982, 1993; Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985; Argyris & Schön, 1989, 1996; Schön, 1983; Torbert, 1976). The theory of action approach (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978) has been the framework for much of this development. The roots of this work are in the action research tradition of Kurt Lewin and in John Dewey's theory of inquiry.

An action science requires an epistemology of practice, a theory of knowledge for action. Donald Schön (1983, 1987) pointed out that normal science has an epistemology of practice, which he called technical rationality. On this model, scientists create basic knowledge; applied scientists tailor knowledge to particular domains of practice; professional schools teach this knowledge to practitioners, who then apply it. This works when practitioners can act as instrumental problem solvers in well-defined situations, selecting technical means to achieve clear ends. But life rarely comes packaged so neatly. Facing an indeterminate, messy situation, we must frame it by selecting what we will pay

attention to and setting a direction for action. Only then can instrumental knowledge be applied. Technical rationality does not account for how practitioners frame situations, how they improvise in unique cases, or how they deal with value conflict and disagreement about what ends are desirable. These competencies are increasingly important as people must coordinate action across organizational boundaries, integrate divergent interests and perspectives, and lead change amidst complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. The model of professional knowledge as technical rationality has least to offer in precisely those areas where the need is greatest.

Schön (1983) proposed that we seek an epistemology of practice implicit in the performances of everyday life. When master practitioners act deftly in difficult situations, they display knowledge that they are not consciously thinking about and often would be unable to state. All of us exhibit tacit knowledge, or what Schön called knowing-in-action, when we recognize a face, speak our native tongue, or smooth over a difficult moment at a party. This is the ordinary form of practical knowledge. Schön pointed out, however, that sometimes we do think about what we are doing, especially when we are puzzled or surprised. He named this reflecting-in-action, and argued that it is central to our ability sometimes to act effectively in unique, ambiguous, or divergent situations. It follows that a key requirement for professional education is to help practitioners develop their capabilities for reflecting-in-action. An important form of this capability is frame reflection, an inquiry into the clashing frames that different parties impose on a situation (Schön & Rein, 1994). An action science may contribute to the quality of reflecting-in-action and frame reflection, and to knowledge for helping practitioners develop these capabilities.

## **Theory of action**

The theory of action approach (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978) is concerned with causality, meaning, and practical reasoning. It shares this focus with the philosophical tradition of analysis of concepts pertaining to action in ordinary language (e.g. Ryle, 1949; von Wright, 1971; Bernstein, 1971). When we act, we mean to do something, to bring about or prevent some state of affairs. Practical reasoning is concerned with choices about what to do, in the context of ethical and political life in a human community.

The root metaphor of the theory of action approach is practical knowledge as a kind of theory. Intelligent performances exhibit a design, as people seek to achieve what they intend or to take care of their concerns. The design can be seen as a theory of the form, 'In situation X, to achieve Y, do Z.' We need not assume that people consciously think about the design before or during action, any more than we think about the rules of grammar that we unerringly follow as we speak. But by inferring the design, or in other words the 'theory of action,' we can make explicit and reflect on our practical knowing. Reflection guided by the theory of action approach often focuses on the reasoning people use for action. Other approaches may guide reflection in different ways (Edmondson, 1996).

There are two kinds of theories of action. Espoused theories are those that the actor believes she follows and is able to state. Theories-in-use are those that can be inferred from actual behaviour. For example, a manager might say, 'I have strong opinions and I state them, but I'm open to being influenced if people come up with things I haven't thought of.' When we observe the manager in action we might hear him

respond to others by saying, 'That's the wrong way to think about it. This is what we have to do.' Repeated observations of this kind might lead us (and the manager's colleagues) to attribute that the theory-in-use is, 'I have strong opinions and I state them, and if others differ I dismiss their views and repeat my own.' People are unaware of much of their own theory-in-use and how it is inconsistent with their espoused theory.

Individual theories-in-use are interdependent with the behavioural world or culture in which people live. We learn our theories-in-use through socialization, and we collectively recreate our behavioural worlds by how we act. An example is the chicken-or-egg problem faced by organizations that launch empowerment efforts. Empowerment depends on managers and employees who take initiative and who can deal productively with differences in view without resorting to command and compliance. Yet today's managers and employees have grown up in organizational worlds that have socialized them in theories-in-use suited for command and compliance. Even when they genuinely espouse empowerment and believe they are acting consistently with it, people in organizations commonly act in ways that disempower themselves and others.

What is it about the theories-in-use people hold that constrains learning? Argyris and Schön (1974, 1996) created a model of the generic features, which they called model I. It is a theory-in-use of unilateral control and protection in which people assume their views are right and seek to impose them on others. Model I has a flip side in which people give up control and withdraw or comply. Both versions contribute to a behavioural world in which important issues are undiscussable, commitment is low, and errors go uncorrected.

Argyris and Schön created an alternative theory-in-use, model II, for joint control and mutual learning. Most people espouse model II, at least for some important situations, and are shocked to discover how their own behaviour falls within model I.

The theory of action approach distinguishes between single-loop and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning is a change of tactics within the same over-arching theory-in-use. Most learning in everyday life falls in this category, as does most skill training offered in organizations. Double-loop learning involves changing the values and reasoning processes by which people design action. Learning model II as one's theory-in-use is an example (Argyris, 1976; Putnam, 1990, 1991).

It may well be that an action science can be constructed on some basis other than the theory of action approach. It seems likely, however, that any approach that might inform an action science would resemble the theory of action in important respects. For example, the leadership theory of Ronald Heifetz (1994), drawing on quite different theoretical sources and practice traditions, makes a distinction between technical and adaptive work that functions in ways similar to the distinction between single-loop and double-loop learning. Like the theory of action, Heifetz's theory has a strong prescriptive component --- as indeed must any practice theory. And it, too, has developed in conjunction with educational activities that engage practitioners in reflecting on practice.

### **Social practices shaping inquiry, choice, and action**

Consider an example: A senior officer of a major corporation and his staff were discussing how to get an important project back on track. A key problem, they agreed, was that the project did not have its own budget. They considered how to address this

issue at an upcoming meeting of the Executive Committee. Their consultant suggested that they roleplay how the conversation might go, with one of them playing the CEO:

Officer: One of the problems is that we don't have a budget, so we have to go hat-in-hand to others.

CEO: Not having a budget is not important. What's important is alignment.

Officer: Absolutely right.

The consultant interrupted, 'I thought you believe the budget issue is crucial.' 'Right,' the officer replied. 'Then what leads you to say "absolutely right" when the CEO says the budget is not important?' 'Oh,' said the officer, 'there is a norm in the top group that no one disagrees overtly.'

Organizations are beset by a host of informal but firmly entrenched practices that constrain their ability to consider important matters. Forecasts are adjusted up or down based on private assessments of the biases of those who supplied information and those who will receive it. Product champions marshal information in support of their arguments and omit or downplay contrary information. Team members avoid criticizing each other's work for fear of being seen as not a team player. Project managers commit to unrealistic schedules in the belief that is how to show they have the 'right stuff.'

Practices such as these cannot be altered by decree. Nor is it sufficient to help individuals learn new ways of acting, necessary as this is. Rather, members of the relevant community must reflect together on how they interact and on the reasoning and norms that guide their behaviour. This is a tall order, because constraining practices often

violate publicly espoused standards of behaviour. To discuss these practices, people must acknowledge participating in them. They must also say things that they have avoided saying lest others become upset. In most people's experience, these conversations have rarely been productive. Standard procedure is to work around constraining practices rather than address them directly. In the case of the senior officer and the CEO, for example, the officer and his staff reported that their usual technique was to speak with the CEO alone in his office. They acknowledged that this did not work well, because other members of the Executive Committee did not go along with decisions that had been negotiated privately. But they were most reluctant either to raise their differences overtly in the Executive Committee or to say that they found it difficult to do so.

Action science seeks to help members of organizations reflect on and improve social practices that shape inquiry, choice, and action. We are guided in this effort by a normative theory that, while unique in its particulars, is based on values central to western thought since the Enlightenment. More to the point, perhaps, they are central to prevailing theories of professional effectiveness, including theories of management. They include the stated values of model II: valid information, informed choice, and internal commitment (Argyris, 1970; Argyris & Schön, 1974). They also include personal responsibility, competence, and justice, in particular the principle that one should act toward others as one expects them to act. These values are deeply embedded in ordinary language and practical reasoning.

The difficulty is that these values often clash with what I will call the socio-emotional reflexes of everyday life. Erving Goffman (1959) based virtually an entire theory of social interaction on face work, describing how a person 'employs

circumlocutions and deceptions, phrasing his replies with careful ambiguity so that the others' face is preserved even if their welfare is not' (1967, p. 17). Edgar Schein (1987) gives face work a central place in his approach to process consultation, writing that 'the deliberate destruction of someone's face is equivalent to social murder' (p. 86). Clearly, the morality of everyday life includes values that often pull people away from open discussion and public inquiry into sensitive matters.

By what right do we challenge or question prevailing social practices that may reflect a compromise among conflicting values? Are we not imposing our values on people? And if so, are we not being inconsistent with our own values of choice and personal responsibility?

Action science proceeds by engaging people in a kind of internal critique of their own practical reasoning and normative commitments. For example, the senior officer and his staff cared deeply about acting for the good of the organization. They also did not want to upset the CEO. They recognized the dilemma or conflict created by these two interests, and they felt caught. Action science involves identifying such dilemmas and inquiring more deeply into them, stimulating critical reflection and the search for alternatives. The process can be uncomfortable as rationalizations are exposed and people confront their complicity in practices they abhor. Doing this work calls for compassion and for a way of constructing the socio-emotional values of caring, support, and respect so that they can be integrated with the values of inquiry, competence, and justice.

I see action science as a kind of critical theory (Bernstein, 1976; Geuss, 1981). Critical theory takes a practical interest in improving human existence. In the language of Jürgen Habermas (1971), a critical theory serves 'emancipatory' interests, which I

understand to encompass fostering human development, choice, and self-responsibility. A critical theory proceeds by engaging people in self-reflection so that they can transform their self-awareness and can act to change their world.

**Case illustration: The manufacturing manager's visit**

The case of the manufacturing manager (pp. 21-22) offers an opportunity to illustrate and to elaborate on key themes in action science.

*Assessing effectiveness.*

Of perhaps 100 people in attendance at the Academy of Management Symposium that was the genesis of this special issue, only two raised their hands to indicate that they assessed the interaction in the case as more effective than ineffective. Almost all the rest indicated that they assessed it as ineffective or counterproductive. I suggest we would find similar results in almost any group, including one composed of members of the organization in which the interaction occurred. Indeed, the Team Leader and the Senior Manager are themselves likely to have evaluated it negatively, although each might well have seen the other as the cause of the ineffectiveness. The case illustrates the gap between actual discourse practices and those that members of organizations themselves believe are productive.

Now let us consider, what is it about the interaction shown in the case that contributes to the ineffectiveness? Answers to this question will vary far more than do global assessments of effectiveness. One way that action science adds value is by offering a theory of effective action that is more powerful and internally consistent than common sense theories, yet simple enough that people can use it in the midst of action. From the

perspective of the theory of action approach and its descriptions of model I and model II, key features of the interaction include:

- Both the Team Leader and the Senior Manager advocate their views and do not inquire into the other's views, nor do they encourage inquiry into their own views. The only question in the entire dialogue is 'what gives?' This comment serves more as a chastising of the Senior Manager than as genuine inquiry.
- Much of the reasoning underlying the advocacy remains implicit. For example, the Senior Manager says 'That won't work,' but does not explain what leads him to think so. Neither does he explain why he believes the team does not need a sounding board.
- Each player seems embedded in his own perspective and displays little curiosity or openness to how the other person sees things. We have better data on the Team Leader's frame of mind, as we have his reconstruction of his unspoken thoughts and feelings (the left-hand column). His perspective seems to be, in effect, 'My view is right, and obviously so; the problem is the unreasonable behaviour of the other guy.' Nothing in the reported dialogue suggests that the Senior Manager is any more aware of the possibility that his own view may be limited and that the Team Leader and Members might have good reason for their proposals.

These features of the interaction are characteristic of model I theory-in-use. When important matters are at stake and the people involved have different perspectives, better results can be achieved when people use model II. Briefly, this would mean that each player advocates his or her view and explains the underlying reasoning, encourages

others to inquire into that reasoning, and inquires genuinely into the views of others.

Sustaining this mode of action requires an underlying frame or stance of openness to the possibility that one's own view may be limited and that others may have a point. As the philosopher of science Karl Popper expressed this attitude, 'While differing widely in the various little bits we know, in our infinite ignorance we are all equal' (1963, p. 29). The practical challenge is, how do we act responsibly in light of our infinite ignorance, neither allowing ourselves to be immobilized by our awareness of how much we do not know, nor assuming that the little bits we know are all we need to know?

*Doing action science: Some possibilities*

We can think of two dimensions to action science. The first is that of helping individuals and organizations to be more effective. The second is that of creating a body of knowledge that goes beyond a particular action context.

On the first dimension, we can distinguish two modes of activity in the action context:

1. Improving the quality of discourse in the moment so that players can do better whatever it is that they are doing. Moves of this kind can be made either by the players involved or by a third party.
2. Engaging the causal factors that lead the players to interact as they do. To bring about fundamental and lasting improvement in the quality of discourse, people

must reflect on and alter assumptions embedded in their social skills and how they construe their world. While some of this can occur on-line, in the midst of practical deliberation, more often it occurs in designated learning sessions.

On the second dimension, in action science we also address a more distant community of inquiry through books and articles (e.g., Putnam, 1991, 1996). What is distinctive about action science in this regard is the relationship between the written research product and in-the-moment action. The on-line skill of those doing action science is crucial to the quality of the research. See Argyris, Putnam, & Smith (1985) for a discussion of research methodology in action science.

The case of the manufacturing manager offers opportunities to illustrate the two modes of action science in the action context. The logic of the following sections is first to illustrate how the Team Leader and the Senior Manager might have handled their encounter more productively. Embedded in the illustrations is a design (or theory-in-use) that is necessary to produce the new behaviour, but that is not made explicit. Then as a second step I consider what it would take for the Team Leader and the Senior Manager to learn the design so that they could be capable of producing the new behaviour. It is at this point that more distinctive features of action science, as discussed in previous sections, may become evident.

### *Improving the conversation in the moment*

Consider how the Team Leader might have responded differently to the Senior Manager's first statement:

Commentary

Advocacy;  
Reasoning not explicit

Redesign:  
Inquire into reasoning

Conversation

Senior Manager: That won't work. You were supposed to develop a precise plan for quality improvement to cut down on costs. We don't need a sounding board.

Team Leader: I agree our objective is quality improvements to cut costs. What is it about our proposal that you believe will not work?

By saying this the Team Leader seeks to find out how the Senior Manager understands the proposal and what concerns it raises in his mind. Suppose that the Senior Manager continues to be somewhat cryptic and aggressive:

Commentary

Advocacy;  
Much reasoning still  
implicit

Redesign:  
Advocacy;  
Makes reasoning

Conversation

Senior Manager: Because there is no plan for how to cut costs. It just leaves things up to each individual.

Team Leader: Our thinking was that we can get the biggest gains by having people close to the problems identify what, in detail, needs to be done, and then doing it. If we create the detailed

explicit plan for others to implement, our concern was that we would not be taking advantage of the knowledge of people close to the problems.

Inquire What's your reaction to that thinking?

This response states a common premise of empowerment and self-directed work team initiatives, and one that the Senior Manager's initial responses seem to violate. By inviting the Senior Manager to comment on it, the Team Leader creates an opportunity to discuss possible differences in fundamental assumptions. The ensuing discussion might also help Team Members see gaps or dilemmas in how they have acted on their assumptions about empowerment.

Conversely, the Senior Manager could have acted more productively while still being tough-minded about the work of the team:

#### Commentary

(See case for full text, p. 18)

Redesign:  
States meaning he infers;  
Makes explicit a concern, inquires

#### Conversation

Team Leader: Each of us will develop an individual project (etc.). . .

Senior Manager: That sounds like your plan is to leave it up to individuals, and to talk about it now and then. My concern is, if this is where you are after six months, why should we have confidence that going about it this way will achieve actual cost reductions in the next six months to a year?

As this redesign illustrates, it is not essential that managers or others be ‘nice’ or ‘supportive,’ as these qualities are often understood. Given the Team Manager’s opening statement, it is reasonable for a senior manager to be concerned that the team may have been unable to make genuine progress and that the proposal to leave the initiative in the hands of each individual is an avoidance of the team’s responsibility. The key from an action science perspective is that the manager treats his concern as a kind of hypothesis to be tested. This can be done by raising it explicitly, stating what leads to the concern, and inviting others to explain how they may differ. Conventional niceness can get in the way, if for example the Senior Manager has concerns but hides them, instead making approving noises that allow all concerned to feel secure in their avoidance of difficult issues.

A third-party interventionist might make related moves to help players have the kind of productive discussion of their differences that they may have difficulty creating by themselves.

Standing outside the interaction, it is relatively easy to rewrite the script to make the conversation more productive. In the moment, however, it would be quite difficult for these players to make changes of the kind illustrated above. What are the causal factors that make this kind of interaction persist, and how might we alter them?

### *Engaging causal factors*

Why would the Team Leader and Senior Manager have difficulty acting, in the moment, in ways illustrated by the redesigns above? An initial answer is, because of the

spontaneous, genuine reactions that they actually have in the moment, as illustrated by the Team Leader's thoughts and feelings (on the left-hand column of the case). Each of the Team Leader's private reactions construes the Senior Manager as wrong for acting as he is and shows the Team Leader as having a strongly negative emotional reaction. He feels that he is the aggrieved party and that the Senior Manager is treating him and the team unfairly and unreasonably. In the grip of these reactions, it is unlikely that the Team Leader can genuinely and in a spirit of openness inquire into the Senior Manager's reasoning. If we had the Senior Manager's unspoken thoughts and feelings, it is probable that the same is true of him.

The next question is, why do people have the kinds of spontaneous reactions that they do? One way of answering is, because of who they are and their way of being in the world. In order for the Team Leader to respond to the Senior Manager's comments with a sense of openness and curiosity, he would in an important sense have to become a different person than he is. He would have to undergo some personal transformation. Argyris and Schön (1974) describe the necessary change as learning a new theory-in-use, one governed by a different set of values. Torbert (this issue) describes it as movement to higher developmental stages.

Another way of answering is to point to the behavioural world in which people have become who they are and in which they currently live. The Team Leader, let us suppose, is a well-socialized member of the organization (after all, he was made team leader), and is responding in just the ways that could be expected of someone in his situation. Changing how the Team Leader reacts may call for changing embedded behavioural routines and the cultural stock of knowledge for how people act in this

organization. From an action science perspective, the personal and social domains are interrelated and it is necessary to work on both.

Working at these levels is on the one hand distinctive of action science as compared to other forms of action research and action learning. Yet it is consistent with Lewin's original vision, which focused on change at the level of values, attitudes, and cultural practices (Lewin & Grabbe, 1948). It is also consistent with seeing action science as a kind of critical theory (Geuss, 1981).

The practical argument for engaging these causal factors is that little fundamental change will occur if we do not. On the other hand, it is not practical simply to advise people to change who they are or to remake their cultures (the current popularity of 'culture change' programs notwithstanding). How can meaningful progress be made on these matters?

In action science we engage people in reflecting on their practice, and especially on inconsistencies in what I will call their logic of action. The case of the manufacturing manager offers several opportunities. For example:

1. The Team Leader says, 'We were told that you wanted us to be empowered and to identify our own work task. What gives?' The logic of the Team Leader's reaction is, in effect, 'Once you empower us, don't criticize our decisions.' Yet this logic, if adhered to, would disempower the Senior Manager.
2. Later the Team Leader thinks to himself, 'You keep cutting us off at the knees --- how do you expect us to get anywhere?' This implies that the Team Leader believes that the team has not gotten far. Yet when the Senior Manager points that out, the Team Leader rejects what he is saying.

Putting these two points together, it is as if the Team Leader follows a logic of action that says, ‘When I know we haven’t gotten far, I will present our proposal as if it is well thought through and I will see it as illegitimate for you to question it.’

3. The Senior Manager says, ‘We don’t need a sounding board.’ Yet he justifies his role in this meeting as, in effect, a sounding board for the team. Why is it useful for him to do it with them, but not for them to do it with each other?

Identifying inconsistencies in people’s logics of action can lead them to feel defensive, flustered, or confused. Doing action science requires skill in framing, naming, and inquiring into inconsistencies so that participants can continue to reflect and learn. Interventions of this kind create a ‘stop-and-think’ in which people reconsider tacit and taken-for-granted assumptions. Such moments can lead people to feel a sense of personal responsibility to change, contributing to the possibility of personal transformation.

Inquiring into inconsistencies of the kind illustrated above often leads to a discussion of underlying concerns, dilemmas, and behavioural routines. For example, the Senior Manager might say that he doesn’t think it would be useful for the team to act as a sounding board for its members because he doubts that members would be appropriately tough on each other. This points to one of the classic difficulties of self-directed work teams: how do members deal with shortcomings in each others’ performance? In the world in which people have grown up, that is a boss’s job. For a peer group to deal effectively with these issues requires, usually, major developmental efforts.

Digging deeper, we might ask the Senior Manager what led him to commission an ‘empowered’ team if he had (perhaps well-grounded) doubts about their ability to

perform? And what led him not to raise these doubts earlier? This might begin to unveil some of the dilemmas created by the political correctness, cynicism, and naivete that afflict empowerment efforts.

Or, the Team Leader might say that the reason he is upset is that the Senior Manager has not given the team adequate support by coming to prior meetings and keeping team membership more stable, yet is holding the team and not himself responsible. We might then ask, ‘What led you not to tell the Senior Manager before now that the team’s performance was in jeopardy because of these things?’ This line of discussion would be a further avenue into the taken-for-granted practices that prevent this organization from making intelligent choices, coordinating action effectively, and enhancing capabilities.

Naming and inquiring into dilemmas and inconsistencies is a difficult enterprise. They are often treated as undiscussable, because discussing them can trigger emotional reactions and, in the experience of participants, has usually been unproductive. Yet not discussing them leads members of organizations into a thicket of covering up, smoothing over, and working around what they believe is really going on. Many of the beliefs and assumptions on which they base action therefore remain unstated, untested, and uncorrected by public inquiry. Action science offers an approach to altering these practices so that members can create work communities that are more aligned with their values and interests.

## The Manufacturing Manager Comes to Visit

**Background:**

In a large high technology company, a team of managers and supervisors were asked to work on a new project to achieve quality and cost improvement through empowerment and self-directed work teams. The senior manufacturing manager charged his staff with identifying individuals for this team and signed off on the project.. The team members were asked to learn more about the issues, take action to address problems that arose, and make recommendations about what the organization might do in the future.

It has now been six months since the project started. The group has invited the senior manager to each of their meetings, but this is the first time they have met with him.

| Thoughts and Feelings  | What We Said   |
|--|--|
| Whew, he finally came to a meeting. He’s been invited to every session. Everyone is really nervous about this session. | <b>Team Leader</b> (to Senior Manager): Our team has decided that our goal will be to identify ways that each of us can help eliminate non-value-added work in our area. Each of us will develop an individual project and implement it over the next year. The team will be our sounding board to improve the project, help us move forward and take additional steps, and so on. |
| What?? You finally come to a meeting six months after we start and suddenly don’t like what we have done?              | <b>Senior Manager:</b> That won’t work. You were supposed to develop a precise plan for quality improvement to cut down on costs. We don’t need a sounding board.  |
| We should have known. This is what they really mean by “empowered” teams.  | <b>Team Leader:</b> We were told that you wanted us to be empowered and to identify our own work task. What gives?   |
| Oh great--we asked for it, so now we got it.   | <b>Senior Manager:</b> You asked me to come to this meeting to hear a progress report and I am telling you what I think of what you’ve done.   |
| You keep cutting us off at the knees--how do you expect us to get anywhere?  | <b>Team Leader:</b> Well, we have done as much as we could with the membership of the team changing every time we meet. You keep adding people, moving people to different jobs, etc.  |
| Can you believe this guy?!   | <b>Senior Manager:</b> That’s how things are now.  |

|                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| <p>In a pig's eye.</p> | <p>Your team should be working to learn how to handle that problem. We all need better ways to deal with changing team membership, people being moved, or demoted, etc.</p> <p><b>Team Leader:</b> We need to discuss this and we will get back to you with our team's goals.</p> |
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Case developed by Karen Watkins

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